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DOES GOD CAUSE SIN? 
ANSELM OF CANTERBURY VERSUS 
JONATHAN EDWARDS ON HUMAN FREEDOM 
AND DNINE SOVEREIGNTY 
Katherin A. Rogers 
Hugh McCann, in trying to make libertarian free choice intelligible, advances 
a position that entails that God is the cause of, though not at fault for, sin. 
William Rowe criticizes McCann regarding freedom, but agrees that God 
could cause sin without blame, and cites Jonathan Edwards' sustained defense 
of this view. I argue, along lines first advanced by Anselm of Canterbury, 
that God does not cause sin. Were He to do so, He would be blameworthy. 
One might charge that Anselm's view unduly limits divine sovereignty, but I 
argue that his work offers sufficient resources to respond to this criticism. 
Recently Hugh McCann has invoked classical theism as a way to solve 
the problem of the apparent unintelligibility of libertarian freedom. 
McCann grants that his position entails that God is the cause of sin, though 
he denies that God is responsible for sin in the sense of being at fault.1 
William Rowe disagrees with McCann's conclusions concerning freedom, 
but agrees that God could be the cause of sin without thereby being blame-
worthy.2 Neither attempts a lengthy discussion of the view that God 
would not be to blame for the sin He causes, but Rowe approvingly cites 
Jonathan Edwards' exposition of this position. Edwards offers a sustained 
defense of this view, motivated by the commitment to preserve the 
absolute sovereignty of God. Here I want to argue that God does not cause 
sin. Were He, per impossibiZe, to do so, He would be blameworthy, 
Edwards' arguments notwithstanding. The arguments I will make are not 
new, having been advanced first nine centuries ago by Anselm of 
Canterbury.3 But since they are powerful and apparently not common 
knowledge among contemporary philosophers of religion, it is important 
to revive them. Anselm's arguments will leave him open to the charge that 
he has unduly limited divine sovereignty, but I will argue that his work 
offers sufficient resources to respond to this criticism. I will first look 
quickly at McCann's view, then at why Anselm emphatically rejects it, and 
then show that Edwards' attempts to salvage the position that God causes 
sin without being blameworthy are unsuccessful. I will conclude by 
defending Anselm's position on divine sovereignty: 
The central problem which many philosophers find with libertarian 
freedom is that it seems to entail that our choices are ultimately lacking any 
adequate explanation. McCann holds that we can solve this problem if we 
situate libertarian freedom in the universe of classical theism, the universe 
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envisioned by Anselm among others. On the classical theist view every-
thing which is truly a thing (the qualification will prove important in dis-
cussing the relationship of God to sin) is kept in being from moment to 
moment by the immediate power of God's thought. McCann argues that 
we can be libertarians and yet hold that our choices are fully explicable if 
we say that it is God's will that causes us with all our choices. Thus, " ... the 
same act of His will that is responsible for my being puts in place my deci-
sions as well."s Again, " ... the same fiat that puts my choices in place deter-
mines my very existence, ... "6 Libertarian choice is rendered intelligible 
because, " ... His [God's] reasons for having me decide as I do, whatever 
they are, will explain fully the occurrence of my decisions, in terms of His 
perfect goodness."7 
It might seem strange that a theory which holds that all of one's choices 
are caused by God should be labeled "libertarian," but McCann's explana-
tion of libertarianism allows for such a move. In McCann's view libertari-
anism depends on two criteria. First, there are no independent determining 
conditions of our deeds. McCann argues that since one's choice is caused 
immediately by God along with one's very existence and is not the product 
of a natural causal order (secondary causation), this criterion is met. 
Secondly, we must be fully active in the performance of our deeds "in the 
way voluntary intentionality requires."8 That is, we must act intentionally 
and we must "feel we are a genuine source of control and spontaneity in the 
universe."q My own intuition is that, were I convinced that God caused all 
my choices, I would not feel that I was a genuine source of control; or if I 
could not root out the feeling, I would judge it to be out of sync with the 
truth. However we settle the terminological question regarding "libertari-
anism," the issue which concerns us here is that McCann's position seems 
to make God responsible for sin and hence to make God do and be evil. 
McCann tries to respond to this problem. "My decision, and any evil 
that lies within it, are predicated of me. What belongs to God is His will-
ing that I shall decide as I do, which is an altogether different matter."l0 
McCann goes on to argue that God's willing that I decide to sin may be 
fully justified as necessary for some greater good, " ... even if my decision is 
morally defective, God can view my making it as indispensable to a situa-
tion that is finally for the best."lI 
Whether or not one can make sense of this position depends, I think, on 
how one analyzes the nature of sin. Anselm holds that to sin is to will 
what God wills that you should not will. But in that case, he goes on, it is 
logically impossible that God could make you sin, since that would entail 
that God wills that you should will what God wills that you should not 
will.12 Anselm holds that God Himself, His nature, is the absolute standard 
for value. Sin is a turning away from God, a rejection of God Himself as the 
standard for value, and something that, in the absolute sense, we ought not 
to do. How can God possibly be its cause? 
On McCann's view it may be true to say that, should someone sexually 
abuse a child, it is not literally God that does it. Or if God does it, He 
nonetheless does not do it in exactly the same way the molestor does. 
(Classical theism, even adding McCann's view that all choices are caused 
by God, is not simply pantheism.) But it is very difficult to see how, if God 
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causes the molester complete with his choice to abuse, He is not to blame 
for the choice and the ensuing act. If one allows that God is responsible for 
the choice and the act, but justified because He is aiming at some greater 
good, then it is hard to see that the choice and the act are not themselves 
justified as necessary means to the divinely desired ends. In that case God 
would be the cause of all choices, but all choices are justified and so should 
have happened. There is no sin in Anselm's sense. McCann does not offer 
an analysis of sin, but if he is in rough agreement with Anselm on its basic 
nature, it is difficult to see how he can preserve both the reality of sin and 
the blamelessness of God. 
William Rowe has criticized McCann's thesis about libertarianism and 
classical theism, but he agrees that God could cause a created agent to sin 
and yet not be "the author of sin" and morally evil Himself. Rowe does 
not explore the point, but cites Jonathan Edwards as having given the same 
argument. 13 Does Jonathan Edwards' sustained defense succeed in 
answering Anselm's criticism of the view that God causes sin? Edwards 
grants that God does, in a way, cause sin. He is not the doer of sin, but " .. .if 
by 'the author of sin,' is meant the permitter, or not a hinderer of sin; and at 
the same time, a disposer of the state of events, in such a manner, for wise, 
holy and most excellent ends and purposes, that sin, if it be pem1itted or 
not hindered, will most certainly and infallibly follow: .. .1 don't deny that 
God is the author of sin, ... "14 So God is "the author of sin" in that He sets 
up the situation in which the created agent sins by causal necessity due to 
its nature if He fails to prevent it, and then He fails to prevent it. 
But God is not culpable for sin Edwards argues. In order to make his 
case he adopts two key theses from Augustine of Hippo. First he follows 
Augustine's line that "evil" per se is nothing. It has no ontological status. 
What is "evil" in the choice of sin is simply a rejection of or a falling away 
from the good. Thus the evil is nothing positive, but simply an abandon-
ing of what one ought to have chosen. Anselm, who in many ways can be 
viewed as the first great medieval spokesman for Augustinian 
Neoplatonism, also embraces this analysis of the basic nature of evil. This 
is important because it enables Anselm to argue that it is the creature that 
causes evil. If God is the absolute source and sustainer of all things and all 
their positive properties, it seems at first as if He must be the cause of evil. 
Anselm grants that whatever in an evil choice has genuine ontological sta-
tus-the agent, the faculty by which the agent chooses, the operant desires 
and motives, even whatever has active power in the choice-is caused by 
God. It is just the bare rejection of the good which is the effect of the creat-
ed agent. Thus the creature can produce a property of certain choices, their 
status as evil, but this does not attribute to the creature any real creative 
power.15 
Anselm and Edwards are in agreement on the importance of analyzing 
sin as merely a lack or failure. But Edwards adopts a second Augustinian 
principle which Anselm deliberately and explicitly rejects. Like Augustine, 
Edwards holds that sin happens inevitably because God withdraws his aid 
from an agent. Though the early Augustine sounds somewhat libertarian 
in his On Free Will, the later Augustine is clearly a compatibilist. The ratio-
nal creature is drawn to choose what it most wants. If left to itself it will 
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inevitably be drawn back towards the nothingness from which it was 
made. Only with extra help from God can it choose the good. And this is 
the case both after and before the Fall. If the creature's choice of the good 
were ever its own doing, then it could make itself better than God made it 
originally. And that is absurd, says Augustine.!6 But this means that God 
is the author of sin only in that He withholds the necessary help, and thus 
God's willing is only a "defective" cause, not an efficient cause of sin. 
Edwards offers the analogy of the sun which causes brightness, but cannot 
truly be said to cause darkness merely by setting, since darkness is simply 
the sun's being absent. He goes on, "It would be strange arguing indeed, 
because men never commit sin, but only when God leaves 'em to 
themselves, and necessarily sin, when he does so, that therefore sin is not 
from themselves, but from God, ... "!7 
Edwards is here making exactly the Augustinian point which led 
Anselm to produce his dialogue, On the Fall of the Devil. (Anselm chooses 
to discuss the fall of the devil as the purest case of a choice between good 
and evil, and the most difficult sin to explain since it was the first. What 
Anselm says about freedom and choice in this context is also applicable to 
prelapsarian human choice, and, mutatis mutandis, to the choice of the fall-
en human being to ding to or abandon grace.) At the beginning of the dia-
logue the interlocutor, the "student", explains that he has heard that the 
original fall of the devil happened because he did not receive from God the 
perseverance necessary to hold fast to the good God had originally given 
to all the angels. But if the devil did not receive perseverance because God 
did not give it to him, then he couldn't help but fall, and the sin would be 
God's fault. The "teacher", Anselm, agrees that the creature could not be 
blamed for its failure if it was made by God such that it must fall without 
God's help, and God simply doesn't offer the requisite aid. True, without 
God's help the creature could not hold to the good, since it is God who 
supplies both the good and the power to ding to it. But Anselm departs 
from the Augustinian position and goes on to argue that God does give the 
help, but the creature can choose to abandon God's help, and the choice to 
retain or reject it must be genuinely up to the creature.'S 
Teacher and student do not spend any more time on the initial argument 
that God would be at fault if He makes a creature such that it must sin 
should He fail to help it, and then He fails to help it. Perhaps they found it 
intuitively obvious. It seems so to me. Edwards' attempts to weaken this 
intuition are not successful. The analogy with the sun fails woefully. The 
sun did not create the solar system, command the land not to get dark, and 
then set. Had it done so, it would be to blame for the darkness. Contrary to 
Edwards' somewhat rhetorical point, it is not "strange" at all to hold God 
responsible when it is He who created men such that they must necessarily 
sin if He does not help them, and then He does not help them. 
If Anselm's intuition needs further motivation, note that a better analogy 
than Edwards' sun example for the situation Augustine and Edwards envi-
sion is that of a magnetic toy. If you built a toy with a magnet inside, placed 
it near an iron object, and then let it go, the toy would inevitably move to 
the iron. You might say correctly that you didn't cause it to move. It moved 
on its own. You just ceased to hold on to it. You are at most the "defective" 
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cause. But since you are the producer of the entire situation, the motion of 
the toy is your responsibility. You built it to move if you did not prevent it, 
and you did not prevent it. It would be especially bizarre if you blamed it for 
doing what you built it to do. Augustine and Edwards hold that God has 
made us with desires which will inevitably draw us to evil if He does not 
help. And He does not help. Perhaps God has excellent reasons for defec-
tively causing us to choose evil, but on this account we simply do what He 
creates us to do. The responsibility is His, not ours. 
What of Anselm's logical problem that sin would be God's willing one 
to will what He wills that one not will? Edwards invokes a principle 
which, to my knowledge, is not found explicitly in Augustine. There is in 
God a revealed will by which He disapproves and opposes moral evil as 
contrary to His nature, and there is a secret will by which He wills and 
determines moral evil in order to achieve His purposes.19 Thus God, by 
His secret will, could will that the agent should will what His revealed will 
wills that he not will. Anselm does not discuss this distinction, (to my 
knowledge it is a later development in the history of theology and so 
unknown to him) but I take it he would find it untenable. In On Truth he 
concludes that God is the absolute standard of truth in which all that is 
right and true participates.2o He would find it unthinkable that God should 
determine the rational creature to seek its own destruction, the negation 
and "falsity" of its nature, and doubly unthinkable that He should secretly 
do so while overtly commanding it to pursue the good. 
Interestingly, a younger contemporary of Anselm's, Peter Abelard, does 
make some remarks germane to Edwards' distinction between the secret 
and revealed wills of God. Abelard says that it is possible that God might 
issue a command which He does not really want to have obeyed. For 
example, Jesus commanded certain blind men he had cured not to tell peo-
ple about it, and yet they did. Abelard thinks it unreasonable to hold these 
men at fault. He explains that Jesus intended to set a good example of 
humility by issuing the command, but that reason judges that the com-
mand should not be obeyed. So there are possible cases in which one 
ought to do, not what God explicitly commands, but something different 
which is what He really wants you to do.21 
Edwards apparently holds, on the contrary, that one has a moral obliga-
tion to obey God's revealed will. (I take it that Edwards would not accept 
the position that "ought implies can" since, on his view, the created agent 
who sins both ought to obey and cannot obey the revealed will of God). 
From the perspective of what is properly owed to God by one who wor-
ships Him, it is Abelard's position that seems more plausible. It is the 
secret will which really embodies what God wants to have happen in the 
universe. If one knew that God's revealed will conflicted with His secret 
will, wouldn't it be better to obey the more fundamental will which actual-
ly expresses the divine sovereignty? 
One might think that God's secret will is not knowable by man, but, 
given Edwards' position, that would be a mistake. Whatever someone 
actually does will, is what God secretly wills that he should will. And what-
ever someone actually does will is determined by God to produce the good 
He has in mind. On Edwards' account, one who wants to bring his choic-
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es into line with the ultimate, sovereign will of God should find it delight-
fully easy since, whatever one wills, one wills in accord with and as deter-
mined by the secret will of God. And one can rest happy in the knowledge 
that one's choices were essential for achieving the goals God had in mind. 
Anselm, on the other hand, holds sin to be against the will of God sim-
pliciter. God permits it, He has excellent reasons to permit it, and He can 
overcome it in achieving His purposes, but He does not will or cause it. 
Even from the divine perspective sin should not be. 
But now the serious difficulty with Anselm's position becomes apparent. 
The rational creature is able to bring about states of affairs which God does 
not choose or want. If it is really up to the creature to hold on to the good or 
abandon it on its own, then God, in fulfilling His purposes in the universe, 
must respond to situations initiated by the creature. But then divine sover-
eignty seems radically limited. Is this really a much better position than the 
one which holds that God is "the author of sin"? No. It is not much better. 
But those are the options. Either God absolutely controls everything, in 
which case sin is His doing, or evil choices really originate with creatures, in 
which case God must deal with circumstances He did not produce. 
Anselm very clearly opts for the latter view. And throughout his work 
he offers the same defense when the suggestion arises that God's omnipo-
tence is compromised when God "must" take action in response to crea-
turely choice. In Why God Became Man, for example, Anselm argues that 
God "had to" become incarnate since that was the best way to salvage 
humanity after the fall. But this is a necessity which arises from God's own 
nature, in that He, being the absolute standard for value, must do the best. 
(On Anselm's account God, unlike the created rational agent, neither has 
nor would be improved by having libertarian freedom.)22 In On the Fall of 
the Devil Anselm makes it clear that it is best that there should be creatures 
with self-causing, libertarian freedom. This is the only way we can be gen-
uine images of God in that, by clinging to the good on our own, we con-
tribute to our own creation.23 Once He has made us He cannot absolutely 
control us, but it His own choice to make us arising out of His perfect 
goodness. He is the absolute author of the original situation. It is not 
unacceptable to theorize self-limitation as consistent with divine sovereign-
ty. (One might argue that any choice on the part of God is an exercise in 
self-limitation. God does not violate the laws of logic, so if He makes it 
that x be the case, He cannot simultaneously make it that not-x be the case, 
and an option is closed off for Him.) 
And notice that McCann and Edwards, though they intend to be 
defending the absolute sovereignty of God, may be charged with failure on 
that score. McCann says explicitly, and Edwards suggests, that God needs 
evil choices to accomplish His ends. But how did He come to find Himself 
in such an unhappy situation? He is either the absolute author of the situa-
tion or He is not. If it is by His will alone that He has chosen, among 
numerous alternative possibilities, a universe in which His goals cannot be 
met without His producing Auschwitz and child abuse, one must wonder 
again about divine goodness. If He simply finds Himself stuck in a world 
in which some necessity outside of His will requires Him to cause moral 
evil to achieve His purposes, then He is not really sovereign. If one is 
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impressed with the reality of evil and sin in our world, it is almost impossi-
bly difficult to reconcile God's absolute goodness and His absolute sover-
eignty. Anselm will not compromise divine goodness, and so he allows 
that God may choose to limit Himself, but he will not see this as a diminu-
tion of divine power. And, much as one might want to mitigate the appar-
ent unintelligibility of libertarian freedom, Anselm will insist that making 
God the cause of all choices including sin is not the solution.24 
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